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Abstract
The arrival of European settlers at the Cape in 1652 marked the beginning of what would
seemingly become an extremely unequal society, with ramiﬁc a t i o n si n t om o d e r n - d a yS o u t h
Africa. In this paper, we measure the income inequality at three diﬀerent points over the ﬁrst
century of Dutch rule at the Cape. What emerges from the study is a society characterised by
severe inequality, with a relatively (and increasingly) poor farming population combined with
pockets of wealth. The inequality is driven largely by wheat and, especially, wine production,
which gave rise to an elite. Historical evidence supports our ﬁndings: Amongst others, the
imposition of sumptuary laws in 1755 is closely correlated with a more segmented elite which
includes both alcohol merchants and (wine) farmers. We compare these measures to those of
other regions and time-periods in history. Although the exact level of inequality is determined to
a large extent by our assumptions, the Cape Colony registers one of the highest Gini-coeﬃcients
in pre-industrial societies. This provides some support to verify the Engerman-Sokoloﬀ hy-
pothesis that initial levels of high inequality would give rise to growth-debilitating institutions,
resulting in higher inequality and underdevelopment.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
While the impact of income inequality on growth remains tenuous, severe inequality may hamper
a country’s growth potential (Sokoloﬀ and Engerman 2000). According to the Engerman-Sokoloﬀ
hypothesis, initial high inequality may give rise to political institutions that favour the economic
elite. Because of the balance of power associated with high inequality, the elite would be able to
maintain the institutions that favour them. This would allow the continuation of rent extraction
and consequently inhibit long-run economic growth in extreme situations.
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) put forward two preconditions for the rise of inequality in a
newly settled society: favourable climate and soil conditions that are conducive to the growing of
(cash) crops, and an extensive native population1 Colonies located in the tropics were endowed
with fertile conditions that encouraged the production of sugar, coﬀee, cocoa, bananas, tobacco and
rubber — in other words, cash crops that are subject to large economies of scale. The realisation of
these economies of scale required labour, sourced from native populations or through slave imports.
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1These two preconditions present one channel through which inequality could aﬀect economic growth. This paper
does not investigate other potential paths which could posit potentially diﬀerent ultimate growth outcomes in the
face of initial inequality.
1Where tropical crops were not readily cultivated, but a large native population was available, labour-
intensive production (mining, for example) may have arisen. This also would have given rise to the
same economies of scale. In both settings, as these labour-intensive industries developed, an elite
secured economic power which it maintained through institutions that promoted the status quo,
namely an unequal distribution of resources. The two institutions often used for this purpose are the
monopolisation of property rights (land or other), and limiting access to education. Engerman and
Sokoloﬀ posit that most Latin American and Caribbean countries model this type of development.
In contrast, in temperate zones and in the absence of large native populations (such as in British
America), a relatively free market developed, promoting institutions (property rights, education and
free trade) that resulted in lower inequality and faster economic growth.
A growing literature has emerged to test this hypothesis. Apart from Engerman and Sokoloﬀ’s
own productive contribution (Engerman, Haber and Sokoloﬀ 2000; Sokoloﬀ and Engerman 2000;
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ 2002; 2003; 2005), Easterly (2007) ﬁnds that inequality results in lower per
capita economic welfare, including worse institutions and schooling outcomes. He shows this using a
new instrument indicating the abundance of land suitable for growing wheat relative to sugarcane,
which is closely related to the Engermann and Sokoloﬀ hypothesis. In contrast, Nunn (2007), while
ﬁnding a negative relationship between slave use and subsequent economic development, ﬁnds no
evidence that the relationship is driven by plantation slavery, which is the channel postulated in the
initial endowments-inequality-growth hypothesis. Even more critically, Williamson (2009a; 2009b)
has argued that there is little evidence to suggest that Latin American countries were uniquely un-
equal for most of the last ﬁve centuries. In fact, when adopting a new measure of income inequality
— the inequality extraction ratio — Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) show that Latin Amer-
ican inequality was on par with most other societies of the time (for which data is available), despite
high levels of inequality in that region in modern times. These results are, however, based on few
and unreliable sources, which Williamson acknowledges in an earlier version of his paper entitled
“History without evidence” (Williamson 2009b).
In order to understand the impact of inequality on later development outcomes, the severity of
early inequality must be measured accurately for countries across the modern development spectrum.
While the preservation of early records enables such measures to be calculated for most of today’s
developed nations, the dearth of detailed early records for the currently developing world limits the
extent to which the hypothesis can be generalised. African regions, especially, are underrepresented
in many of these studies, as the set of countries in Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) conﬁrm.
This paper ﬁlls this gap, by calculating income inequality of a currently developing region that is
also highly unequal today. In contrast to Willamson’s (2008) ﬁndings for Latin America, the Cape
Colony was unequal at the time of its settlement, and this has persisted into modern day South
Africa, possibly aﬀecting its potential to grow into a developed economy. Indeed, in this case,
although the casual hypothesis that high levels of initial inequality inﬂuence the economic status
quo appears to be valid, we realise that much further analysis is required to identify the mechanisms
by which early inequality may have determined later inequality
The purpose of this paper is to measure income inequality in the Dutch Cape Colony over three
points of its 143 years of existence. Using micro-level tax return records and wage data, we infer
income inequality for the entire population of the Cape economy, including slaves. In contrast to
many other inﬂuential studies (such as Milanovic et al., 2008), the data allows the measurement
of within-group inequality in a pre-industrial society2, which appears to be a more important com-
ponent of inequality than previously assumed. The results suggest that the Cape was a relatively
unequal society compared to most other countries. Inequality between slaves and Europeans played
a large role in the large disparities in income. However, inequality within the European population
contributed more substantially to the overall skewness of the distribution. Given that wages of
Dutch East India Company (VOC) employees were fairly equally spread (by any standard), much
2At least within the European population. The data still do not allow the measurement of diﬀerences within groups
of slave and wage labourers.
2of the inequality has its roots in the unequal distribution of agricultural income. After the arrival
of the French Huguenots and the shift to viticulture, Cape society became more polarised into a
(wine) farming elite and stagnant groups, including increasingly impoverished farmers and slaves.
This evidence is in line with anecdotal reconstructions and recent wealth inequality measures (Fourie
and von Fintel 2010a).
This paper continues as follows. Section 2 motivates why a study of the Cape Colony ﬁlls the
gaps in the comparative literature. Section 3 considers wealth inequality (which was previously
measured at the Cape) and proposes a strategy to measure income inequality in the same society
to make results internationally comparable. Section 4 outlines the data sources and assumptions
used to construct the income distribution of the various population groups at the Cape. Section
5 highlights other important methodological considerations. Section 6 discusses the results, while
section 7 places these in the context of other recent evidence. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Cape Colony as a case study
Given the sparse evidence on inequality in pre-industrial Africa, we turn to one of its well-known
colonies as a starting point. While the measures of income inequality constructed by Milanovic et
al. (2008) cover a wide range of regions and time periods, the currently developing world is under-
represented in their analysis. The broader validity of historical income inequality as a precursor to
poor modern economic growth potential crucially depends on a better understanding of the income
distributions of these regions in early times. A case study of the Cape Colony (a part of modern South
Africa) enriches this view and adds to the small cross section of pre-industrial inequality measures
for developing regions. Today South Africa is a highly unequal society; although it is currently
Africa’s most developed economy, it remains a developing region in the international context and
has a long history of inequality.
The Cape, at the southern point of the African continent, was settled in 1652 by the Dutch East
India Company (VOC — Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie) as a refreshment station for passing
ships. The settlement soon expanded into the interior and a small but widely dispersed free settler
society was established supplying the fort with fresh produce, notably wheat, wine and cattle. By
1795, 143 years after the arrival of the Dutch, the Cape Colony covered roughly 110 000 square miles
(Giliomee 2003) and was home to 7,129 Europeans and 16,839 slaves (van Duin and Ross 1987).
The Cape Colony presents itself as an ideal case study of the rise of inequality (within the Eu-
ropean society but also between Europeans and slaves) in a newly settled, pre-industrial society.
The Cape was unique in its geography, demographic composition and its market and political in-
stitutions. The original intention of the VOC was not to colonise the Cape with a view to extract
resources, as was its strategy in the East Indies and slave settlements in West Africa (which were run
under the auspices of the Dutch West India Company). With few additional beneﬁts (apart from
providing fresh produce), the VOC ensured that - above all - the costs of the new settlement had to
be kept to a minimum. The policies put into practice at the Cape therefore reﬂect this sentiment.
Furthermore, the area close to Cape Town does not share the same tropical climate with other
former VOC settlements, and indeed that of many currently developing regions. The Cape has
a Mediterranean climate and is suitable for growing European crops. Yet, the ﬁrst settlers found
the soil and climate harsh; the strong South-easterly winds, for example, rendered agricultural
production close to the fort and harbour diﬃcult, and settlers had to move inland (either to the
more fertile areas below Table Mountain or to the area west of the ﬁrst mountain ranges) to ensure
a steady supply of wheat, in particular. The rough shrubs (fynbos) of the Western Cape also made
tilling and cultivation of the land diﬃcult. There is some indication of experimentation with various
other forms of agriculture. However, for a variety reasons, the yields from these attempts were
modest.
Slave labour played a prominent role in the Cape economy and heavily deﬁned the composition
3of the population. Slaves were imported from early on and increased rapidly in number after the
movement of free settlers into the fertile area west of the ﬁrst mountain ranges (where they became
wine and wheat farmers). A unique characteristic of the Cape was that almost all free farmers owned
at least a few slaves as production inputs, so than one might expect diﬀerences between the entire
European population and other groups to be widespread. While some of these slaves lived on the
estates of wealthy wine and wheat farmers, even the poorer farmers of the interior owned slaves,
often to help settlers in their homes (Du Plessis, Jansen and Von Fintel 2010). The widespread
ownership of slaves, even in poorer households, is diﬀerent to the large slave plantations of the U.S.
South and the Caribbean slave societies often studied to analyse inequality. In those regions slave
ownership was concentrated in the hands of few very wealthy individuals. Nevertheless, most slaves
were owned by the very rich at the Cape, indicating that inequality within the European settler
sub-population is also an important research question.
The European immigrants were mostly poor, single ex-Company employees with little expertise
in agriculture. Often the tough conditions — including the frequent conﬂicts with the native Khoikhoi
— forced these settlers to return to Company service or escape to Europe. One group of immigrants
— the French Huguenots who arrived in 1688 — arrived with families and skills that would dramat-
ically boost output and productivity at the Cape (Fourie and Von Fintel 2010c). Yet, after 1717,
immigration was mostly limited and population growth relied mostly on high fertility rates amongst
European settlers. This development prompted the formation of a small elite on the back of the
newly introduced wine industry, which, according to Fourie and Von Fintel (2010c), later became a
driver of inequality at the Cape.
The unique market institutions created by the VOC shaped production decisions at the Cape.
Free trade was prohibited by the Company; all production had to be sold at a ﬁxed price to the
monopsonist Company. These prices declined as production increased (Du Plessis and Du Plessis
2009). While wheat and wine outputs were market driven, there is little indication that cattle
farmers on the frontier were inﬂuenced by the demand from the ships at the coast (Boshoﬀ and
Fourie 2010). Farmers were only allowed to sell their goods to the ships once the Company’s own
inventories had been exhausted. Manufacturing was prohibited, especially for the export market,
except in the case of wine and brandy which had to compete in the East Indies with French exports.
Heavy duties were levied on imported goods. Free settlers had no political rights and although free
(in other words not employed by the Company), were under Company jurisdiction (Schoeman 2007).
As a result, many farmers became impoverished and either abandoned their operations, or became
nomadic farmers on the frontier. By implication, inequality increased, as this large group became
further divorced from the rising elite in the income distribution.
This newly settled, pre-industrial society evolved into modern-day South Africa, a society char-
acterised as one of the most unequal in the modern world. Accurate measures of Cape Colony
inequality could establish whether the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ conjecture holds in more societies
than the examples they quote to support their hypothesis, or whether the evidence that refutes their
ideas (most notably Williamson, 2009a and 2009b and Milanovic et al, 2008), is based on a limited
sample of the currently developing world. To do this, reliable measures of inequality in the Cape
society are developed in the sections that follow.
3 From wealth inequality to income inequality
Economists are not the ﬁrst to be concerned by the inequality in the Cape society; historians have for
long noted the high inequality in Cape society and its possible detrimental impact on development
(Guelke and Shell 1983). Even Company oﬃcials during the period noted the severe inequality
between the rich pachters (monopoly merchants) residing in Cape Town or on lavish (wine) estates,
and the poor bywoners (who farmed on richer farmers’ lands) and trekboere (nomadic farmers)
of the interior. Travel writers, especially, note the social divisions between the various groups,
4often referring only to the European part of the population with slaves and the Khoikhoi excluded
(Thunberg 1986).
Apart from Guelke and Shell’s (1983) descriptive analysis of wealth inequality in the Cape Colony,
the only quantitative measurement of inequality for this period is by Fourie and Von Fintel (2010a).
Using tax return records they measure the dynamics of wealth inequality of burghers at the Cape
for the period 1663 to 1757. They ﬁnd that the Cape burgher population was a highly unequal
sub-section of society and identify possible causes of such high inequality. The arrival of French
Huguenots had two impacts on the wealth distribution; ﬁrstly, the new immigrants arrived with
no assets, adding to the bottom of the distribution. Secondly, their arrival marked the uptake of
viticulture, which was adopted by a new elite (from both French and other population groups).
Both impacts gave rise to severe wealth inequality. However, this inequality slowly declined as poor
French farmers’ wealth increased and immigration of assetless Europeans was discouraged. Towards
the middle of the eighteenth century, wealth inequality stabilised at a high level within the farming
population. An indicator of the high inequality during the eighteenth century is the imposition of
sumptuary laws in 1755, aimed at prohibiting the show of luxury in public (for example, the number
of horses and carriages that were allowed to be decorated).
While Fourie and Von Fintel’s (2010a) results provide an important ﬁrst estimate of inequality
at the Cape, the limitations in their study blurs the larger inequality picture. Firstly, their focus is
only on the farmer population, excluding Company oﬃcials and non-farmers. (They do account for
slaves and European knechts, but as assetless individuals, each with zeroes in the data). Secondly
and more importantly, they calculate wealth inequality based on the ﬁrst principal component of a
basket of core assets. This approach is not comparable to the income inequality measures calculated
by Milanovic et al. (2008) to trace diﬀerences in pre-industrial inequality across various regions of
the world. The diﬀerences between assets as a stock concept and income as a ﬂow concept entail that
these results are not the same. The object of this study is to oﬀer a more representative measure
to complement their work and obtain a fuller picture of pre-industrial inequality. The discussion
of the results below reconciles diﬀerences in inequality between both measures. Thirdly, their work
also assumes that the relative weights of assets remained the same across the entire period, while
it is clear from Table 1 that values of agricultural commodities changed over time (though here
agricultural ﬂows rather than stocks are measured).
4D a t a S o u r c e s
To construct the representative income distribution of the whole Cape population is a complex
undertaking, especially since wage data are lacking for the majority of the population: many house-
holds worked for their own consumption or slave labour was paid in kind. Various sources of data
are therefore synthesised in this study to provide an overall picture of inequality.
The period of analysis is determined primarily by the ability to match the various sources of data
concurrently. However, the resulting series of inequality estimates corresponds with demographic
shifts that directly aﬀected the distribution of well-being at the Cape. Cross sections of households
are constructed for 1700, 1723 and 1757. The ﬁrst two decades of the eighteenth century coincide
with a peak in wealth inequality as per Fourie and Von Fintel (2010a); during this time (in 1717)
European immigration to the Cape was discouraged in favour of slave importation, thereby changing
the composition of the lower tail of the wealth distribution substantially. On the other hand, 1757
represents a time when policies were designed to limit the extravagance of a new Cape elite.
4.1 Incomes of Free Citizens and their Servants
Micro data collected by the VOC are rich in their coverage of the European population at the Cape.
Given that the colony was managed by a company, detailed records for the purposes of taxation were
5maintained on an annual basis. The bulk of the European population was not directly employed
by the VOC, but was commissioned to bolster agricultural production as free burghers (citizens)
in the interior. However, this privilege required the annual payment of taxes on land outputs and
stocks. Hans Heese (1979) has transcribed a selection of the so-called annual opgaafrollen,t h eo ﬃcial
burgher tax returns required by the VOC which contain detailed micro-level information on assets
and yields of the free population. Each of these cross sections comprises a census of European
households that were not in the company’s employment3 and provide details on quantities of all the
products that formed part of the income basket of this group. Fourie and Von Fintel (2010a) use
the number of slaves, the possession of stock and some short-term assets recorded in these data to
produce estimates of asset inequality in roughly 5year intervals over an extensive period from 1663
to 1757. However, the attention of this paper turns away from stock concepts to income ﬂows in
speciﬁcy e a r s .
Yields (rather than short-term assets) are multiplied by prices from archival sources to calculate
household income from farming activities. Prices were obtained mostly from auction rolls, and the
most consistent ﬁgures in each year were chosen to represent the market value of each commodity
in the respective years.4 Though some variation did exist, the prices in 1757 are the most stable. In
the robustness checks discussed below this observation is taken into account to ensure that incomes
estimated in this way were consistent across time. Table 1 summarises units of production available
in farmers’ tax returns, as well as the archival sources of prices that were used in the relevant years.
It is assumed that 15% of animals were sold to generate income in any given year (van Duin and
Ross 1987). However, horses not being a strictly consumption item, are assumed to be kept in
greater numbers by farmers, with only 5% sold in any period. Furthermore, horse rearing was an
arduous task at the Cape due to horse sickness and other diseases (Swart 2003), so that it was not
a promising income source.5 Hence, the ratio applied here is indeed an upper bound.
The tax returns reveal that a substantial proportion of the population was not engaged in any
agricultural activity whatsoever. Particularly in urban Cape Town, many burgher households only
recorded the ownership of slaves, horses and weapons, with no evidence of any seeds sown, vines
planted, stock possession or agricultural yields. Owing to the nature of the data, however, no other
income was recorded, nor is there any indication regarding the mode of economic activity of these
households. A simple imputation approach is adopted here to generate the income distribution
of this section of the population. The log of total household incomes of farmers6 is regressed on
variables indicating the gender and adult-child split of slaves owned and household members, the
number of horses, and the number of weapons in each period. Parameters from these models are
used to construct incomes for the non-farming burgher population.7 Slavery is the most important
predictor in this context. Slave ownership is strongly positively correlated with wine and wheat
yields, suggesting that this is a good indicator of the capability to generate income (Armstrong
and Worden 1988). Other authors have also used slave ownership as an indicator of elitism in Cape
society (Giliomee 2003; Fourie and Von Fintel 2010b). Indeed, the ﬁt of the regression is satisfactory,
with R-squareds in excess of 0.5. However, this approach assumes that the monetary returns (in
terms of income from outputs) on slave labour are the same for farmers and non-farmers, while in
the latter case it is not certain in which activity workers were employed, and whether these were
indeed slave-intensive sectors that would have yielded the same returns as in agriculture.8 Further,
3Ac o m p a r i s o nw i t ha l t e r n a t i v eo ﬃcial records (Van Duin and Ross, 1987: 112-127) suggest that the version of
the opgaafrollen used here capture very close to all households in the colony, including total slave and European
servant numbers in non-VOC employ. Slight discrepancies are accounted for by adjusting the weights applied to each
household, as discussed below.
4The source of the price data are the probate inventories available in MOOC8 and the auction rolls available in
MOOC10.
5O u rt h a n k sg ot oS a n d r aS w a r tf o rp o i n t i n gt h i so u t .
6Deﬁned here as any household that at the minimum sows seed, has vines or has animals.
7In converting the predicted log(Household Income) back to the linear form, we adjust estimates for prediction
errors, as per Wooldridge (2009).
8Yet, while the assumption of equality of returns between agricultural production and non-agricultural production
6the distribution of this predicted income is narrower than that for farmers ap r i o r i , as the regression
line moderates much of the dispersion in the data.
Up to this point, non-agricultural activity among free citizens has been largely uncaptured.
However, the Cape Colony was not only well-known as a refreshment station for ships to replenish
food supplies, but also as a stop-over where sailors sought entertainment along the sea route. Alcohol
monopolists (pachters) played an important role in this social context. These individuals bought
exclusive rights from the VOC to sell alcohol to the public. Groenewald (2007; 2009) provides a
vital exploration of their role in Cape society. It is evident that the high prices that they paid for
these selling rights were rewarded by much higher returns. We identify the alcohol pachters in the
opgaafrolle and record the amount that each monopolist paid for these rights in the respective years.
Krause (1955) cites two separate examples, one in 1684 and another in 1685, from which it is possible
to calculate the ratio of gross proﬁts to initial monopolist fees. Both indicate that the gross proﬁts
were 247% of the monopolist fee paid. We apply this ﬁgure to each of the alcohol sellers (who were
incidentally also very successful wine farmers) that were recorded in the tax records.9 However, this
estimate of income from monopoly contracts appears excessive, and is not necessarily representative
of the entire period of analysis. The result is that only a few households skewed the upper tail of
the income distribution to very high levels. Given that this income type was atypical of the entire
population, and that more reliable estimates of returns on monopoly contracts are not forthcoming,
analyses include and exclude this source of income to test the robustness thereof. We note that
monopolies also existed in other markets, but, to the authors’ knowledge, detailed information is
not available.
While slaves and European servants did not submit tax returns of their own, information on their
numbers is included in the entries of their supervisors or owners. This information is exploited to
ﬂesh out the income distribution beyond the free European population. However, we rely on averages
for each type of labour to impute incomes to these individuals, as detailed micro-level information
was not recorded for these population segments.
The main source of income data for these individuals is the transcript of a Policy Council meeting
held in the Cape of Good Hope. A discussion document sent by the Lords XVII in Amsterdam to
t h eC a p eo nt h e2 4 th of June 1716 requested feedback on a number of policy related issues, of which
a few relevant ones are listed here: ﬁrstly, they wanted to establish whether more immigrants could
ﬁnd a means of subsistence in the colony without becoming a burden to the Company; secondly, they
discussed whether European farm hands and agriculturalists would be less expensive than slaves,
and thirdly whether the colonial economy required more artisans. Seven Company oﬃcials, in 1717,
responded to the discussion document, arguing in favour of or against the Amsterdam proposals,
and often provided quantitative proof for their arguments. The letters were later translated by John
X. Merriman and published in 1918 by the Van Riebeeck Society (De Chavonnes 1918).
In terms of European servants, the following discourse followed. Jan de la Fontaine, later to be
governor of the Cape Colony, wrote in a letter to the Council of Policy in the Cape of Good Hope
that “the wages paid to a [European] farm labourer for a year and half would often pay for a slave,
as the usual wage of such a labourer is 15-20 guldens a month, exclusive of food, which would be
considerably more for a European than for a slave”. D.M. Pasques de Chavonnes calculated the
cost of a “pioneer” to be 9 gulden per month, and that of a youth in training, 6 gulden per month,
plus approximately 2 gulden per head per month for bread and another 2 gulden for lodging (De
Chavonnes 1918:106). Van Beaumont also calculated the wage costs at 9 gulden per month, “the
rate of a soldier’s pay” (De Chavonnes 1918:100), while Cranendonk noted that a farm labourer
would “cost the Company 14 gulden odd per month” (De Chavonnes 1918:98). Van der Meer
Pietersoon estimated that “farm-servants here usually earn from 10 to 16 and even 18 guldens and
a r es t r o n g ,t h ef a c tt h a tf r e eb u r g h e r sc o u l dm o v ef r e e l yb e t w e e nt h et o w na n dt h er u r a la r e a sa n dt h a tt h ep r i c e s
of slaves were determined in a “free” market, one would expect that slaves would have been purchased by those that
would have been able to extract the highest return, eventually equalising the marginal returns per worker.
9Only isolated cases were not found in the opgaafrollen.
7more, in addition to good food and drink, besides 1 to 2 lbs. of tobacco per month.” (De Chavonnes
1918:126). The wage and “in kind” cost of farm labourers was therefore estimated to be between
13 and 18 guldens per month, or between 156 and 216 guldens per annum. In this study, European
servants (knechts) are all assumed to be paid 13 guilders per month in 1700, based on the soldier’s
salary and an allowance for food. A separate household is created for each servant employed by the
free citizens — a lack of additional information means that no wives or children are added to these
households. Given that the servants were often unmarried Company employees stationed at the
Cape (Romero 2003), these servants likely had few dependants and therefore the full income carries
a weight of 1 person in per capita conversions. The impact of this assumption becomes clearer below.
Similarly, the policy documents were used to establish credible income imputations for slaves.
Given that slaves did not strictly earn an income, we impute a basic cost of living value to each
slave recorded in the data. Cranendonk, in his letter to the Council of Policy in 1717 examining the
expenses on slaves for the last ﬁve years, calculates that “every slave — adults, boys and girls — costs
the Company about 40 gulden a year, including expense of clothing” (De Chavonnes 1918:96). Van
Beaumont also concludes that “a slave costs annually (everything included) about f40”. According
to Van der Meer Pietersoon, “each slave ...costs the Company only 40 guldens per year, but as there
are many children among them, the slave of a private person is usually estimated at f60, reckoning
1 rixdollar per month for food, a length of tobacco per week, 2 pairs of trousers and one coat per
year” (De Chavonnes 1918:126). It seems that the cost per slave was between 40 and 60 guilders per
annum or between 3.5 and 5 guilders per month in 1717, depending on whether they had dependants
or not. Each adult slave is imputed with a value of 40 guilders, while the premium of 20 guilders
is assigned to child slaves in the data. Again, a new household was created for each slave owned
by a free citizen, which carries a weight of one in a per capita index. However, in contrast to the
European servants we know how many female and child slaves were owned by each free citizen, so
that a certain element of household composition is known. Nevertheless, it is not clear which of the
slaves were directly related, so that we create artiﬁcial households for each male, female and child
slave separately. These separate households also contribute a weight of 1 person for a per capita
variable. Household weights are adjusted to account for under or over representation, as well as to
inﬂate slave numbers to reﬂect slave numbers of those in VOC possession. The latter’s numbers are
not linked to owners in the micro data, but aggregate ﬁgures of VOC slave ownership allows us to
inﬂate the weights so that the number of privately owned slaves also represent those owned by the
company. This is discussed in more detail below.
4.2 Income of VOC Employees and Company Oﬃcials
Apart from the rural population, the Company employed a few hundred soldiers and oﬃcials in
and around the fort. Other artisans, oﬃcials, teachers, medical staﬀ and administrators were also
employed by the company. Data for these are sourced from the monsterrollen (records of VOC
oﬃcials, their occupations and wages), as transcribed by the TEPC (2008) and recently compiled
into a wage index by Du Plessis and Du Plessis (2009). By comparing the total number of wage
earners in these data with the number of company employees in van Duin & Ross (1987), it is
evident that records were more complete in some years than others. Only those years with suﬃcient
representation are kept in the analysis. We link the 1699 wage cross section with the opgaafrol of 1700
to sketch a complete picture of the population at the Cape. Similarly, wage data for 1724 are merged
with the 1723 free citizen tax data, as are the wage data from 1756 and the tax data from 1757.
This allows us to study almost complete population censuses in these three periods. Wageearning
households are also assumed to be of size 1, as indicated in the TEPC (2008) transcriptions, though
it is possible that company employees did settle for longer periods with families. This has more
severe implications for per capita income estimates than is the case for knechts; the assumption
that these households did not grow (which is not true for other European households) means that
per capita income could be overestimated for this group in later years. As a result, betweengroup
8inequality estimates are adversely aﬀected.
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5.1 Weighting
Van Duin and Ross (1987) provide population totals from a reliable set of opgaafrollen and other
VOC records. Discrepancies between the version of the data used here and their totals are small (for
free citizens and servants), so that adjusting household weights for sample diﬀerences does not alter
the picture substantially. However, their totals diﬀer more substantially from the TEPC (2008)
data for VOC employees, so that weighting is non-negligible here. Further, as mentioned above,
slave numbers are weighted not just to reﬂect Van Duin and Ross’s (1987) population totals, but
also to account for the lack of micro records of slaves in VOC possession. Each of the slaves in
the possession of free citizens is weighted up, to also represent company slaves. Tables 2 and 3
summarise the population totals in the relevant years, as well as the weighting factors that were
applied to the data. It is evident that in most cases the reweighting should be inconsequential for
the results. Exceptions exist in 170010 for slaves (when a relatively large proportion of them were
held by the VOC, and would therefore not be reﬂected in the opgaafrollen) and in 1724, when VOC
employees tend to be under-captured by the TEPC data.
Total household incomes are converted to per capita household income levels throughout. In cal-
culating inequality indices and plotting distributions, these are weighted by household size, adjusted
for the sampling diﬀerences referred to above.
5.2 Price ﬂuctuations
Du Plessis and Du Plessis (2009) illustrate that real wages increased over time as a result of a
declining overall price level, coupled with stable nominal wages over the entire century. This grad-
ual deﬂation is also reﬂected in Table 1, where the prices obtained by farmers for their output
are generally lower later in the sample. By implication, farmers’ nominal incomes decline when
multiplying the falling prices with the respective quantities; this stands in contrast with the expe-
rience of VOC employees, whose nominal wages were stable across time (Du Plessis and Du Plessis
2009). As a result, estimates of between-group inequality are aﬀected if this discrepancy between
the sub-distributions is not remedied.
Three approaches are implemented to account for price ﬂuctuations. Firstly, farming and wage
income in all years are converted to 1700 prices with the most favoured price index computed by
Du Plessis and Du Plessis (2009). The same price index converts slaves’ incomes (as outlined in the
policy discussions) from 1717 to 1700 prices, and it is assumed that real incomes remain constant for
this group, despite increases for other sections of society. However, this assumption is not necessarily
true for European servants: While nominal wages in 1717 may have been similar in all the other
periods, they would have been higher (in 1700 prices) in later periods. Hence the price adjustment is
also done for this group. Secondly, 1700 prices are applied to each of the farming commodities in all
years, so that farmingincome changes are only driven by ﬂuctuations in quantity. In this scenario,
the resulting farm incomes are not scaled by the price index, while those of the other groups are
(as before). Thirdly, the same strategy is followed with 1757 commodity prices to derive real farm
incomes, as these are considered most stable both within and across product groups. All other
incomes are converted to 1757 prices.
10Figures for 1700 are not available from Van Duin & Ross (1987), hence numbers for 1702 are used as a proxy.
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6.1 Changes in mean per capita income
Table 4 provides an overview of the major shifts in average real per capita incomes of various
groups from 1700 to 1757. As conﬁrmed by Du Plessis and Du Plessis’ (2009) overall indices,
VOC employees’ real incomes rose in light of price deﬂation. For similar reasons, farming burghers’
real incomes decline, as the prices that they obtain for individual products decline; adjusting for
the overall price level does not alter this picture. It is possible that income sources diversiﬁed for
farmers later in the period, so that this decline was not as stark in reality as it appears in the data.
Evidence provided by Van Duin and Ross (1987) on Cape Colony exports provide further proof of
more diversiﬁed activities by the farmers; the mid-eighteenth century saw an increase in the exports
of ivory, skins and hides, butter, wax, aloes, oil, to name a few. None of these activities are recorded
in the available data. What is clear from these records, however, is that traditional agriculture
became less proﬁtable on a per capita level, or that its share in total income of farmers diminished
relative to new income sources.
Agricultural income initially compared favourably with VOC wages, while later it is evident that
even knechts earned more (on a household per capita level) than farmers. However, the farming
population almost doubled, while this increase is not so rapid for VOC employees and knechts.
The analysis assumes that the latter groups had no children or wives, and that these particular
households did not grow. For farmers, however, household composition changed over time, with
households generally becoming larger (and total yields not necessarily showing the same increase;
s e eF i g u r e1 ) . C o m b i n i n gt h e s ef e a t u r e s , per capita incomes of VOC employees and knechts are
likely to be biased upwards, though the extent of this cannot be measured. Therefore two sources of
possible mismeasurement arise: First, diverse incomes of burghers are not captured by the available
records, and second, the lack of household structures for some of the non-farming sectors in the
m i c r od a t ad on o tr e ﬂect the real demographic shifts at the Cape.
A similar pattern emerges for non-farming burghers. However, the ﬁgures are substantially lower
compared to those of their farming counterparts, and are driven largely by the imputation strategy
implemented. Again, a lack of information on diverse income sources limits the analysis. Pachters’
returns decline over time the implications of which are discussed below. Real incomes of knechts
increase marginally in line with the price index applied, while slaves’ real incomes remain constant
by assumption. They evidently constitute the poorest groups in this society.
6.2 Robustness checks of inequality measures
6.2.1 Prices
First we consider the inﬂuence that diﬀerent assumptions regarding agricultural output prices have
on estimates of overall and between-group inequality. Making no adjustment for these output prices
in income estimates (not shown) — in other words assuming that their buying power was eroded by
lower market prices for their products — does not appear to yield very diﬀerent results from the other
approaches. This indicates that the inﬂuence of output prices does not bias inequality estimates in
favour of other groups.
Further minor diﬀerences arise for Gini coeﬃcients using diﬀerent adjustments for prices (see
Table 6). Notably, when excluding income from pacht monopolies and the living cost of slaves,
estimates of inequality increase marginally over the century (when adjusting income for an overall
price index), while ﬁxing speciﬁc output prices to speciﬁc years causes a slight reversal in this trend
in 1757. Overall, however, estimates of between-group inequality appear to yield robust results over
time.
106.2.2 The role of extreme tails
Including all income types and population groups captured in the sample suggests that Gini inequal-
ity declined from estimates of 0.792-0.837 in 1700 to 0.713-0.744 in 1757 (see Table 6). However,
given that pachter income declined over the period (see Table 4), and that the returns on monopoly
contracts are not reliably estimated, the decline in inequality is driven by a shrinking upper tail
of the income distribution (which is driven by a small group of non-representative elites). Table 5
illustrates that the greatest relative changes in income occurred at the very top of the distribution
if pachter income is taken into consideration, while the percentiles changed in similar magnitudes
across the distribution if it is excluded. Hence, large (perhaps artiﬁcial) falls in monopoly rents drive
inequality trends downwards over time.
Income from pachts is disregarded in the next set of Gini estimates (Table 6), resulting in a slight
increase in inequality from 1700 to 1757. Gini coeﬃcients drop from their high levels to estimates of
between 0.543-0.569 in 1700 and 0.555-0.590 in 1757, with slightly higher estimates in 1723. While
this study acknowledges the potentially large role that pachter income played in fuelling inequality,
the inadequate measurement thereof precludes any reliable level or trend analysis on this basis.
Nevertheless, whether monopolist income is included or excluded, it is apparent that between-group
inequality (based on the Theil decomposition in Table 7) declined by between 5-13 percentage points
(depending on the strategy followed to account for changing output prices) from 1700 to 1757. The
decline is more rapid when pacht income is included, underlining that pachters’ returns dampened
over time according to the calculations made here: however, it is not certain whether this is a real
phenomenon (in light of the sumptuary laws) or purely a measurement issue (given limited data on
their real returns across time).
The decline in between-group inequality that remains despite excluding the income from pachts
can be explained by movements at the bottom of the income distribution. Because we do not
measure income diﬀerences among slaves, much of the inequality is by default driven by diﬀerences
between slaves and Europeans. However, this is not such a heroic assumption, given what we
know about the well-being of this group. If we further exclude slaves from the population (in
addition to pacht income), inequality estimates fall even further in level terms, now with a Gini
lowerbound of 0.475-0.479 in 1700 and a climax of between 0.539-0.587 in 1757. The change from
a decreasing to an increasing inequality trajectory is driven completely by changes in between-group
inequality. Once slaves are excluded from the sample, most estimates show that about 90% of
European inequality occurred within groups rather than between groups, compared to only about
60% if slaves are also accounted for (Table 7)11. This suggests that slaves’ low mean income relative
to Europeans constituted a large component of inequality at the Cape, which is consistent with
intuition. Nevertheless, these results do emphasise that betweengroup inequality dominated the
picture; this contrasts with the assumptions of Milanovic et al. (2008) who assume (based on the
available data in the social tables) that withingroup inequality was zero.
Given that we assume that slaves’ real incomes remain constant (a reasonable assumption given
that slaves’ remuneration was often in kind) and that many Europeans’ real incomes increased over
time, the decline in inequality in the broader population requires further explanation. Figure 2 shows
that slaves’ share of income increased over time; part of this is driven by faster population growth
compared to Europeans. However, the gap between slaves’ share of income and their population
share narrowed over time, so that population growth does not explain the entire picture. The
progressive relative impoverishment of farmers over the period completes the picture; while other
groups’ income shares remained stable, it is apparent that the lower prices obtained for produce
could not sustain agricultural incomes as in time past. It is not necessarily true that farmers did
become as poor as depicted here, but it is possible that their income sources became more diversiﬁed
as the economy matured and alternative industry became more established. Nevertheless, qualitative
evidence suggests that many farmers struggled to survive, either abandoning their farms altogether
11Note, however, that the lack of variation in imputed slave incomes artiﬁcially drives this ﬁgure down.
11or moving into the interior to become pastoral farmers (Guelke 1980). In fact, these results provide
further evidence to fuel the debate about the reasons why farmers moved to the frontier, supporting
the notion that “push” factors ( in the form of declining incomes) played an important role (van der
Merwe 1938; Neumark 1956; Guelke 1976).
6.3 Income inequality within groups
Because inequality is predominantly found within groups, we analyse each subpopulation separately.
Among VOC employees, inequality is particularly low in levels and remained stable in the region
of 0.3, as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient. Figure 4 reveals that the distribution of employee wage
income remained fairly consistent over time, except for minor improvements in the position of the
6th to 9th deciles in 1757.
In contrast, income Ginis of farming burghers started at relatively high levels of 0.55-0.57 (de-
pending on how output prices are accounted for) in 1700, and rose steadily thereafter to 0.65-0.69
in 1757. Table 5 reveals that while incomes captured in this data dropped for most of the farmer
distribution, they did so faster for the lower quantiles. Figure 3 reveals that non-trivial weight fell
at the extreme top of the distribution, which grew to much higher levels by 1757, indicating that
an elite had indeed formed by this point12 While the same caveats mentioned above apply here,
it is nevertheless true that traditional agricultural income became more unequal over the period.13
Limiting the sample to only VOC wage earners and farming burghers, it is evident that in excess
of 90% of inequality is found within groups, and that this ﬁgure possibly increases over time (only
under the assumption of ﬁxing agricultural prices at 1700 levels). This suggests that the initial
diﬀerences (and subsequent divergence) in mean incomes between these groups do not dominate
inequality measures, but that the rise in European income inequality is driven largely by a skewer
distribution of agricultural income. This has important implications for alternative estimates of
income inequality in the literature, which assumes that inequality is found predominantly between
groups (Milanovic et al., 2008).
6.3.1 Decomposition of Agricultural Income Inequality by Source
Given that agricultural income represents the thrust of reliably measured changes in withingroup
income inequality, this particular sector is decomposed by income source to understand which types
of production drove the inequality. Earlier descriptive work suggests that a strong correlation exists
between largescale viticulture and a large slave labour force, causing the rise of an elite, particularly
towards the latter part of the period under study (Fourie and Von Fintel 2010b)
Shorrocks (1982) and Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) propose decomposing the Gini coeﬃcient into






where Gk represents the Gini coeﬃcient of the kth income source, Sk is the source’s share in total
income and Rk is the source’s correlation with the overall income distribution. If one income source
is unequally distributed relatively to others, it should contribute more to overall inequality. However,
if that income source only has a small share in total income, then its impact on the overall Gini may
be dampened. Similarly, if the distribution of an income source does not correspond strongly to the
overall distribution of income, then it is not driving the general inequality observed in the overall
Gini. This paper implements López-Feldman’s (2006) module, which also estimates marginal eﬀects.
12This group is not reﬂe c t e di nT a b l e5 ,a st h i sr e a l l yi sa b o v et h e9 9 th percentile, and hence constitutes a very
small group.
13The analysis of non-farming burgher income inequality is inconclusive, but is dependent on the imputation strategy
that was followed. Again, unrecorded incomes limit the full picture of this section of the population.
12Elasticities denoting the percentage change in the overall Gini coeﬃcient should each income source
increase by 1 percent are calculated here. Results are presented in Table 8.
Across all years it is evident that the distributions of wine, grains and cattle are consistently
and highly correlated with the overall agricultural income distribution, suggesting that these income
sources reﬂect the overall distribution best14 Further, these sources together represent more than
70% of traditional agricultural income. Wine clearly was the most dominant income source of farmers
across time, constituting in excess of 40 per cent of agricultural income15 While this income source
is never the most unequally distributed among products, its Gini coeﬃcients are consistently high.
In all years (except 1723), it contributes more to the overall Gini coeﬃcient than its share in income.
The marginal eﬀects reveal that most often an increase in income from animals marginally decreases
the Gini coeﬃcient. Grains and wine consistently drive inequality upwards if income from these
sources increases. However, these income sources do not have high Gini elasticities (with all ﬁgures
below 1). Nevertheless, by 1757 it is evident that wine is the dominant contributor to inequality,
and a 1 per cent increase in this income type leads to a 0.08% increase in Gini inequality. These
ﬁndings corroborate those of Fourie and Von Fintel (2010b), which suggest that the rise of the wine
industry formed an elitist class among farmers at the Cape. This was true, despite the general levels
of poverty otherwise registered among this population. Overall, however, some farming households
were able to capitalise on the use of slaves to increase wine yields and become wealthy relative to
most other farmers.
6.4 Reconciling Wealth and Income Inequality Estimates
How do these results compare with those of wealth inequality, notably those of Guelke and Shell
(1983) and Fourie and Von Fintel (2010a)? The latter paper shows that the assets of farmers
increased over the period, with poor immigrants converging on more established settlers. At the
same time, some farmers were able to accumulate substantial amounts of assets to form an elite.
This contrasts slightly with the income evidence of farmers presented here. As is evident in Tables
4, average real incomes of farmers declined substantially over the period, and the distribution of the
entire population shifted leftward (Table 5), except at extremely high percentiles (Figure 3). The
latter underscores the growth of an elite among burghers at the Cape, or at least that its position
remained stable relative to the eroding incomes ofp o o r e rd e c i l e s .T h ee v i d e n c eo fa ni n c o m ee l i t ei s
not as clear as for the asset elite, and the accumulation of assets is not reﬂected in higher incomes
over time at the lower part of the distribution.
Furthermore, diﬀerences between burghers’ income and wealth are a function of how slaves are
treated in the separate studies. When measuring wealth inequality, the increasing numbers of slaves
are considered to be assets in the hands of Europeans. Removing this asset from (in many cases
elitist) settlers, and creating (poor) households of these slaves in the current context, causes a
substantial change in the income distribution relative to the wealth distribution.
Understanding the diﬀerences between income as a ﬂow concept and assets as a stock concept
is also necessary to interpret the results. The accumulation of slaves by households over the period
suggests that substantial wealth had been gathered by settlers during the 18th century. This explains
the period of “convergence”, the eﬀects of which persisted as older generations transferred established
farming operations to their descendants. However, whether the proﬁtability of these assets in farming
activity continued over time, or whether assets were employed to branch into alternative economic
activity, is not clear from the data available. What is certain, however, is that traditional farming
activity in itself became more unequally proﬁtable (despite declines in the average levels in favour
of alternative economic activity). Figure 3 reveals that between 1700 and 1723 that this shift
14Cumulative densities (not shown) conﬁrm that this is true. In particular, the long upper tails that emerge in
agricultural income by 1757 are discernable in each of these categories.
151723 is a notable exception. This is driven partially by the price decline between 1700 and 1723. However, this
price does not recover in 1757, suggesting that quantities declined dramatically in 1723, but turned around by 1757.
13almost exclusively occurred for the ﬁrst 9 farming deciles, while the elite maintained its proﬁtability.
Together, this fuelled inequality. The cumulative density for 1757 exhibits poverty dominance, so
that the whole agricultural distribution deteriorated by this point in time. However, it is evident
that a long upper tail emerges by 1757, which corroborates all other evidence of a small farming
elite that became rich from mainly viticulture.
7 Comparative performance
The main purpose of measuring inequality in the Cape Colony is to add to estimates that test the
relevance or validity of theories postulating that high initial inequality may explain later inequal-
ity and underdevelopment, amongst others by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2000; 2002). The claims
made by these authors have been widely disputed, both on theoretical grounds but also because
of empirical realities. Williamson (2009a; 2009b), in particular, has argued that while modernday
Latin America may be highly unequal, this is not as a result of inequality immediately after coloni-
sation. In fact, he argues that Latin American exhibited average levels of inequality immediately
after colonisation, with rising inequality during the 17th and 18th centuries. Following independence,
inequality seemed to be no higher in Latin America than in other pre-industrial societies or even the
industrialised North. Only during the belle époque of the nineteenth century did Latin American
inequality increase signiﬁcantly above inequality levels of comparator countries. While Williamson
(2009a) points out that these ﬁndings are inconsistent with the Engerman-Sokoloﬀ hypothesis, he
calculates an extraction ratio for each of these countries, showing that when this measure is used,
the Engerman-Sokoloﬀ hypothesis holds true.
Table 9 provides a comparison of Gini coeﬃcients for diﬀerent regions across time, as measured by
Milanovic et al. (2008), and the Ginis calculated here for the Cape Colony in the eighteenth century.
The results show that the conservative estimates of inequality at the Cape (where the pachters are
excluded) rank as some of the highest inequality measures documented before the twentieth century.
The Cape Colony consistently performs worse than the European countries in the sample (except
Holland in 1732) and share similar high levels of inequality to those of New Spain and Chile in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is especially these regions that Engerman-Sokoloﬀ refer
to when postulating their endowments-inequality hypothesis. Based on this evidence, one might
conclude that high initial inequality at the Cape persisted to modern day South Africa.
However, the Cape’s comparative record is subject to a number of caveats. Firstly, these estimates
may be higher than the comparable ﬁgures of Milanovic et al. (2008) because they use social
tables, where within-group inequality is assumed to be zero. This study reveals that (particularly
within the farming population) within-group inequality was high relative to betweengroup inequality,
though some subpopulations (for instance the VOC wage earners) displayed more moderate levels of
inequality. Hence, using the social tables likely underestimates inequality, while the use of micro data
here oﬀers a more realistic view of the income distribution. Thus, either pre-industrial inequality
has been grossly underestimated for all regions using the social tables (and all societies more closely
approximated the Cape Colony) or the Cape was indeed an exceptionally unequal society. The
ﬁrst case would counter any Kuznets-type argument that initial inequality was low in pre-industrial
societies, and would also not concur with the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ notion that currently developed
nations would have been relatively equal in the pre-industrial era. The second scenario suggests that
the Cape was indeed a highly unequal region in the 17th century and remained part of the developing
world into the 21st century with persistent inequality. This ﬁts the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ narrative
well.
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Using detailed records collected by the Dutch East India Company, we calculate new income inequal-
ity measures for the Cape Colony during the eighteenth century. We ﬁnd that income inequality was
severe and persistent throughout the period. Depending on various assumptions, the Cape Colony
Gini ranged between 0.543 and 0.837 which is high relative to other countries for which measure-
ments exist during the pre-industrial period. The diﬀerences in mean incomes between slaves and
Europeans only partially explain high levels of inequality. Notably, withingroup inequality (particu-
larly among farmers) plays an important role that cannot be accounted for in social tables often used
in such studies. Our results support earlier qualitative and quantitative evidence of a rising farming
elite in the Cape Colony relative to the progressive impoverishment of others. While (recorded)
farming income declined in real terms across most of the distribution (except at the extreme top,
where the elite either maintained or extended their positions), this decline was faster for the bottom
tail. Poorer farmers’ positions quite possibly deteriorated because of the distorted market incentives
created by a mercantilist system. Because their produce was not guaranteed to be proﬁtably sold (in
contrast to the elites), they diverted their production to subsistence living, often by moving closer
to the frontier if their farming operations failed. However, this system favoured the elite, who could
continue selling their large wine and wheat yields to the VOC and, through the pacht system, earn
monopoly proﬁts.
Disaggregating the sources of inequality provides a more comprehensive analysis of agricultural
income trends in the Cape. We ﬁnd that wheat and especially wine production drive income inequal-
ity upwards. This is consistent with the literature: The arrival of French Huguenots at the Cape
in the late seventeenth century led to a shift towards viticulture. Being a labourintensive industry,
wine production resulted in a greater demand for slave labour. Slave imports increased after 1700,
and especially after 1717 when the Council of Policy at the Cape restricted European immigration
in favour of slave labour. These changes gave rise to a small elite at the Cape consisting mostly
of alcohol pachters and wine farmers; proof of this is provided by the rising inequality within the
farmer population in our results. By 1757, while the majority of farmers had gained little in terms
of welfare, sumptuary laws were introduced to curb the luxurious lifestyles of the farming elite.
The divergence between the poor (but majority) farmers and the rising elite gave rise to severe
inequality at the Cape. Although the purpose of the current paper is not to verify or refute the
Engerman-Sokoloﬀ hypothesis in a larger context, it is tempting to suggest that the persistent high
levels of inequality in the Cape Colony of the eighteenth century measured here may, to a certain
extent, be a root cause of South Africa’s high income inequality, and consequent underdevelopment
today. Gini coeﬃcients measured here are remarkably similar to those found in modernday South
Africa. Nevertheless these estimates add to the evidence that their narrative can hold, even in a very
speciﬁc context. This, to some extent, stands in contrast with other work that does not consider a
full set of modern developing regions, and prompts a re-investigation of these matters.
However, this ﬁrst set of inequality estimates for a modern developing African economy may not
be entirely comparable with other estimates for the rest of the world. The estimates presented here
are severe, either because the Cape really was one of the most unequal pre-industrial societies (among
those for which measurements are currently available), or because the contribution of within-group
inequality is ignored for lack of micro data in other regions. Should the former be true, it adds to the
body of evidence that developing countries across the world (not just in samples for which estimates
have been constructed up to now) potentially match the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ narrative. While
this contrasts with some evidence from Latin America (Williamson, 2009a), it begs the question of
whether all measurement issues are satisfactorily addressed using social tables. However, should the
latter be a prominent issue, it is evident that some theoretical links between pre-industrial inequal-
ity and growth require renewed thought. More such histories with evidence, calculating within- and
between-group inequality across diﬀerent regions, will enable scholars to identify more accurately
the mechanisms by which early inequality inﬂuences later development and underdevelopment. Fur-
15thermore, this research prompts the inclusion of a wider spectrum of crosscountry pre-Industrial
inequality estimates to more fully understand links with consequent development. In particular,
excluded regions from the currently developing world would add signiﬁcantly to the picture. While
the Cape appears to have had among the highest levels of inequality in the pre-Industrial era, it is
quite likely that other colonies exhibited a similarly severe degree of inequality.
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1700 Grain (muid) 8.1 MOOC8/165
1724 Grain (muid) 6 MOOC10/3.42*
1757 Grain (muid) 6 MOOC8/9.29*, MOOC8/10.15*
1700 Wine (leaguer) 75 MOOC8/8.150
1724 Wine (leaguer) 51 MOOC10/3.53*
1757 Wine (leaguer) 48 MOOC8/8.23*
1700 Cattle (head) 30 MOOC8.150
1724 Cattle (head) 24 MOOC10/3.48*
1757 Cattle (head) 9.36 MOOC8/8.42*
1700 Horses (head) 50 MOOC8.150
1724 Horses (head) 90 MOOC10/3.42
1757 Horses (head) 10 MOOC8/8.42*
1700 Pig (head) 3.42 MOOC8/2.12*, MOOC 10/1.21*
1724 Pig (head) 5.25 MOOC10/3.58*
1757 Pig (head) 4.2 MOOC10/5.22*
1700 Sheep (head) 2 MOOC8.150
1724 Sheep (head) 6 MOOC10/3.48*











































1702 502  270  337 333 1442 90 653 120  41 36 850 358 0.421
1723  679  433  544  589  2245  119  2224  408  139  151  2922  553  0.189 















  1700    1255 71 668 113  40 39 860 0 0.000
1702    1554 91 649 124  52 41 866 0 0.000
1723    2395 116 2293 422  155 141 3011 0 0.000




















  1700     
1702    1.078 1.011 0.994 1.033  1.268 1.139
1723    1.067 0.975 1.031 1.034  1.115 0.934



















1702    0.928 0.989 1.430 1.375  1.121 1.248
1723    0.937 1.026 1.153 1.150  1.066 1.274










Year  Van Duin & Ross TEPC (current sample) % captured by TEPC Weighting factor
1699    502   0
1724  829 661 0.7973462 1.254160363




























1700  169 244  121 4473 15914  204 52 52 26 26
  (172) (382)  (96) (3221) (9882) 
  531 845  401 37 6 70 955 155 45 49
1723  149 192  87 2412 5150  140 52 52 26 26
  (176) (334)  (113) (2004) (5431) 
  821 1496  926 41 7 119 2645 485 165 180
1757  187 107  67 9794 1758  218 52 52 26 26
  (184) (243)  (63) (3884) (1971) 









  With Pacht Income Without Pacht Income Farming Burgher Income Only
Percentile  1700‐1723 1723‐1757 1700‐1723 1723‐1757 1700‐1723 1723‐1757
1  ‐57.998% 31.045% ‐62.198% 45.606% ‐95.233% 1488.589%
5  ‐40.227% ‐18.904% ‐43.601% ‐14.053% ‐73.332% 19.485%
10  ‐45.805% ‐26.178% ‐45.805% ‐26.595% ‐46.029% ‐39.014%
25  0.000% ‐33.596% 0.000% ‐34.230% ‐37.850% ‐57.202%
50  ‐17.855% 0.000% ‐17.855% 0.000% ‐30.314% ‐59.240%
75  ‐37.623% ‐32.497% ‐37.497% ‐33.841% ‐30.991% ‐40.885%
90  ‐31.806% ‐20.588% ‐28.952% ‐16.023% ‐14.442% ‐30.216%
95  ‐36.851% ‐31.199% ‐23.043% ‐30.055% 14.123% ‐35.800%

















   1700 1723  1757 1700 1723 1757 1700 1723 1757 
  Whole Population
d 0.792 0.761  0.742 0.792 0.757 0.713 0.837 0.816 0.744 
  Whole Population (excluding income from pachts)








VOC Employees 0.284 0.310  0.297 0.284 0.310 0.297 0.284 0.310 0.297 
Farming Burghers 0.554 0.625  0.689 0.554 0.636 0.652 0.565 0.659 0.689 



















  1700  1723  1757  1700  1723  1757  1700  1723  1757 
Whole Population









0.478  0.641  0.679  0.481  0.720  0.602  0.472  0.712  0.669 
VOC Employees  0.238  0.266  0.235  0.238  0.266  0.235  0.238  0.266  0.235 
Farming Burghers  0.607  0.765  1.003  0.607  0.805  0.895  0.629  0.867  1.003 
Other Burghers (Imputed Figures)  0.267  0.594  0.320  0.267  0.577  0.302  0.290  0.528  0.320 
Between
d  0.445  0.375  0.338  0.445  0.391  0.382  0.380  0.324  0.331 
Within
















0.923  0.926  0.901  0.919  0.891  0.983  0.895  0.877  0.908 
Between (Wage & Agriculture)
g  0.031  0.012  0.050  0.031  0.042  0.001  0.004  0.002  0.050 
Within (Wage & Agriculture)
 g  0.969  0.988  0.950  0.969  0.958  0.999  0.996  0.998  0.950 
Between (Slaves and rest)
h  0.351  0.321  0.252  0.350  0.321  0.342  0.314  0.271  0.252 
Within (Slaves and rest)



























1700  Grain  0.274  0.628  0.898  0.281  0.007 
Cattle  0.206  0.570  0.855  0.183 ‐ 0.023 
Wine  0.436  0.621  0.900  0.444  0.008 
Sheep  0.076  0.754  0.822  0.085  0.010 
Pigs  0.001  0.860  0.694  0.001  0.000 
Horses  0.007  0.625  0.677  0.006 ‐ 0.002 
Total  Agricultural Income  1.000  0.549      1.000
1723  Grain  0.312  0.765  0.916  0.348  0.036 
Cattle  0.223  0.603  0.897  0.192 ‐ 0.031 
Wine  0.203  0.773  0.819  0.205  0.002 
Sheep  0.236  0.685  0.900  0.232 ‐ 0.005 
Pigs  0.003  0.812  0.627  0.002 ‐ 0.001 
Horses  0.023  0.738  0.798  0.021 ‐ 0.001 
Total  Agricultural Income  1.000  0.628      1.000
1757  Grain  0.258  0.905  0.888  0.301  0.043 
Cattle  0.156  0.592  0.711  0.096 ‐ 0.061 
Wine  0.441  0.880  0.921  0.519  0.078 
Sheep  0.134  0.604  0.651  0.077 ‐ 0.058 
Pigs  0.001  0.990  0.864  0.001  0.000 
Horses  0.010  0.647  0.771  0.007 ‐ 0.003 









Country/region  Year  Gini  Source 
Tuscany  1427  46.1  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
South Serbia  1455  20.9  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Holland  1561  56  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Levant  1596  39.8  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
England & Wales  1688  45  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Cape Colony  1700  54.3 – 83.7  Own analysis 
Cape Colony  1723  58.2 – 81.6  Own analysis 
Holland  1732  61.1  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Moghul India  1750  48.9  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Old Castille  1752  52.5  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Cape Colony  1757  55.5 ‐ 74.4  Own analysis 
England & Wales  1759  45.9  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
France  1788  55.9  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Nueva España  1790  63.5  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
England & Wales  1801  51.5  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Bihar (India)  1807  33.5  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Netherlands  1808  57  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Naples  1811  28.4  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Chile  1861  63.7  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Brazil  1872  43.3  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Peru  1876  42.2  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Java  1880  39.7  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
China  1880  24.5  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Japan  1886  39.5  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
Kenya  1914  33.2  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008) 
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Figure 4 Cumulative Density Functions of VOC Employees ‐ by year 
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